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FOREWORD

I am grateful to Professor Leila Sadat, Patrick McCarthy, and Dr. Ben
Moore for inviting me to participate in this symposium, which explores
issues of truly profound importance. I am delighted to be here for several
One is the opportunity to visit St. Louis, home to an
reasons.
extraordinary community of Bosnian-Americans who have so enriched its
vibrant culture. At a time when our national government, like many
others, is determined to close our borders to those seeking safety from
harm, St. Louis is living testament to our nobler instincts: this city stepped

This article is a reprinting of the keynote address given on October 4-, 2019 at a
*
symposium regarding The Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in
Understanding the War and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Symposium was sponsored by the
Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, the Bosnia
Memory Project at Fontbonne University and The Global Studies Law Review.
Prof. Orentlicher, American University Washington College of Law; former Deputy for
**
War Crimes Issues in the U.S. Department of State.
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up to welcome Bosnian refugees during their native country's darkest
hour.
This symposium also provides a welcome opportunity to salute
Professor Sadat's leading role in generating an effort, now underway at the
United Nations, to draft a treaty on crimes against humanity. In one
respect, she follows in a long tradition: brilliant and visionary women have
played key roles in other historic efforts to construct the ramparts of
human protection from the bricks and mortar of international law. Yet
those women's contributions have so often been erased in legal histories. I
am confident this will not happen to Leila. But just for good measure, I
seize every opportunity I can to recognize that she is the person who
pioneered efforts to develop a treaty on crimes against humanity.
And of course, it is an honor to address a subject that has been a key
focus of my work for many years, the impact and legacies of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY" or
"Tribunal").
More precisely, for over a dozen years, much of my
scholarship has sought to understand the Tribunal's impact beyond its own
courtrooms and judgments.

I See Andrea Y. Henderson, St. Louis Welcomed This Bosnian Muslim Woman, Now She's
Giving Back, ST. LOUIs PUB. RADIO (July 23, 2019), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/st-louiswelcomed-bosnian-muslim-woman-now-shes-giving-back#stream/0.
2 See,
e.g.,
Initiative Fact Sheet,
WHITNEY
R.
HARRIS
WORLD
L.
INST.
http://sites.law.wustl.edu/WashULaw/crimesagainsthumanity/about/fact-sheet-about-the-crimesagainst-humanity-initiative/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) for information about the Crimes Against
Humanity Initiative of the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, which Professor Sadat leads.
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INTRODUCTION

As the title of this symposium reflects, a critically important dimension
of the Tribunal's legacy is its role in understanding the war and genocide
in Bosnia. In my remarks, I want to drill down on the word
"understanding," one of the most complex facets of the ICTY's legacy.
In brief, I will make four points. The first is that the ICTY's expected
contribution to understanding the 1990s conflict in Bosnia and the
atrocities associated with that conflict was deeply important to many
individuals whom I have interviewed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in
Serbia, about the ICTY's impact in their countries.
Second, the hard facts and legal conclusions established through court
procedures, however impartial and rigorous, do not automatically translate
into general knowledge or understanding, particularly in polarized
societies. On the contrary, despite the work of the ICTY, denialism about
wartime atrocities has been on the rise in the former Yugoslavia.
Third, the rise in denialism in Bosnia and its neighbors despite the
ICTY's work highlights a significant challenge for human rights
champions everywhere, as well as for citizens of Bosnia, Serbia, and other
Western Balkan countries.
Finally, I will conclude with several thoughts about how we can honor
the sacred duty of remembrance in a way that enriches our understanding
of the past in the challenging context of polarized societies.

MEMORIES OF JUDGMENT

2020]

317

H. ASPIRATIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL'S REGIONAL SUPPORTERS:
DISPELLING DENIAL AND FOSTERING ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My book Some Kind of Justice,, as well as my earlier research on the
ICTY's impact, began with a question: What did the ICTY, which was
launched by diplomats in New York and based in The Hague,, mean in the
daily lives of Bosnians, who had endured unspeakable horrors during the
1990s conflict in their country, and to Serbians, whose wartime leader had
plunged the former Yugoslavia into calamitous violence?
Through field research in Bosnia and Serbia, I quickly learned that
citizens of both countries-more precisely, those citizens who supported
the ICTY'-had more than a few expectations about what the Tribunal
would deliver. While armed conflict was still underway, some hoped its
very creation would send a powerful signal to those committing brutal
crimes that the international community would no longer tolerate their
depredations; many Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) in particular thought the
Tribunal would deliver the justice they desperately needed.Many believed and hoped the ICTY's work would have a wider, and
lasting, social impact. Of particular relevance to the subject of this
symposium, many of the Tribunal's supporters in both Serbia and Bosnia
believed its work would bring an end to pernicious forms of denialism
about wartime atrocities, which had been pervasive during the 1990s
conflict itself, and have persisted long after the conflict ended.

3
SERBIA

DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE: THE ICTY'S IMPACT IN BOSNIA AND

(2018).

-

DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY
4
https://wwwjusticeinitiative.org/uploads/el8cc4a9-a631-4471-a22d(2010),
BOSNIA
IN
29a203662478/that-someone-guilty-20100708.pdf. See also DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, SHRINKING THE
(2008),
SERBIA
IN
ICTY
THE
OF
IMPACT
THE
DENIAL:
FOR
SPACE
9 2 3
https://wwwjusticeinitiative.org/uploads/aObe82c5-aa8a-4bcd- d
bcef4d94f93c/serbia_20080501.pdf.
The United Nations Security Council created the ICTY in May 1993, more than a year after
5
brutal conflict came to Bosnia. See S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
Although the ICTY was extremely unpopular in Serbia, it nonetheless enjoyed robust
6
support from a minority of Serbian citizens. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 4, at 114.
See id. at 24.
7
See id. at 5, 91-92, 94-96.
8
See Alicia Ely Yamin, Ethnic Cleansing and Other Lies: Combining Health and Human
9
Rights in the Search for Truth and Justice in the Former Yugoslavia, 2 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 58, 60,
78-79 (1996).
10 ORENTLICHER,supra note 4, at444.
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Throughout the three-and-a-half-year conflict, Serbian propaganda had
portrayed Bosnian Muslims as a mortal threat- and routinely inverted
reality to bolster this narrative.- For example, Serbian media justified
brutal Serb attacks against innocent civilians by claiming Bosnian
Muslims attacked themselves.
Similarly, when Bosnian Serb forces
executed some 8,000 Bosniaks in Srebrenica in mid-July 19995,
journalists working for Serbian media dutifully reported the claim of
Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Madi6 that civilians in Srebrenica
were safe and Bosniak soldiers who had been captured were "being treated
in compliance with the Geneva Convention[s]."For those who had survived horrific crimes, of whom the
overwhelming majority were Bosniak,- this brand of denialism was a
further torment on top of the shattering losses they had already
experienced.
For these individuals, the end of denialism and, more
affirmatively, acknowledgment of terrible wrongs would be a precious
form of repair.
In a meaningful sense, then, survivors of wartime atrocities anticipated
that Hague justice would be a justice of memory. The Tribunal would,
they reckoned, authoritatively refute the falsehoods through which
perpetrators of wartime atrocities had sought to justify their actions. In
doing so, it would construct an accurate and just collective memory of
what happened in the 1990s conflict.
As for citizens whose country or ethnic community had been associated
with atrocities, whether by organizing, committing, or silently condoning
them, those who welcomed the ICTY believed acknowledgment of their
country's or ethnic community's grievous wrongs was a necessary step
toward atonement and, many hoped, ultimately toward reconciliation.'
But these hopes were not realized-not, at least, in the transformative
way many expected. To be sure, the Tribunal did its part admirably: its

11

See Vojin Dimitrijevid, Serbia: Towards European Integration with the Burden of the Past?,

in THE VIOLENT DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA:

CAUSES,

DYNAMICS AND

EFFECTS 211, 211

(Miroslav Hadfi6 ed., 2004).
12 See Sabrina P. Ramet, The Denial Syndrome and Its Consequences: Serbian Political
Culture Since 2000,40 COMMUNIST & POST-COMMUNIST STUD. 41,47 (2007).

13 ORENTLICHER, supra note 4, at 217; see also id. at 99-100, 232, 281-82.
14 See id. at 5, 195.
15 The overwhelming majority of atrocities prosecuted in The Hague were committed by ethnic
Serbs and with the support of the Serbian government. See id. at 196. Nevertheless, members of each
major ethnic group in Bosnia committed war crimes, and the issues of acknowledgment to which I
refer here are to some extent relevant for Bosniaks and Croats as well as Serbs.
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investigative work is impressive, and the results of its efforts will be
crucial to any responsible history of the 1990s conflicts. The ICTY's
judgments have, moreover, set forth in meticulous and compelling detail
key facts about wartime atrocities, including responsibility for them.
Unfortunately, however, credibly establishing crucial facts did not
translate into a shared understanding among major ethnic groups in the
former Yugoslavia of what took place during the 1990s conflicts. Far from
it. In the words of Serbian civil society activist Marijana Toma, despite the
ICTY's work, throughout the former Yugoslavia, "What we are seeing
now, there are... conflicts of memory. We have wars of memory, like ...
Serbian version of the past or this Croatian version of the past, in conflict
with each other. And you have ... wars for memory. And that is what we
are waging here.'
Now I want to be clear: none of this is to suggest the ICTY failed to
In fact, I believe it influenced the beliefs and
influence beliefs.
understanding of many citizens in the former Yugoslavia.- But this is a far
cry from dispelling denialism, which has remained a prominent feature of
public discourses and has, in fact, intensified in the past decade.My book draws upon the astute insights of Bosnian and Serbian
citizens, as well as a wealth of social science research, to explain why, in
retrospect, this should not have come as a surprise. As we know all too
well in the present moment of "post-truth" America, the availability of
credible information, which the ICTY produced in abundance, is not the
same as widespread knowledge or understanding.' Rather, the ICTY's
judgments provide grist for interpretation-they are merely "inputs," if
you will, for memory-making processes.
A raft of social science research helps us understand why, even when
confronted with credible information, many people resist believing it. A
few examples of underlying dynamics illustrate the point.
First, many of us are disinclined to believe information that makes us

16
17

Id. at 122.
See id. at 236-39; 244.

18

See DIANE ORENTLICHER, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE: THE ICTY'S IMPACT IN BOSNIA AND

SERBIA 444-45 (2d ed. 2019).
19 See Susan B. Glasser, Covering Politics in a "Post-Truth" America, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/essay/covering-politics-in-a-post-truthamerica/.
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feel bad about ourselves. And if we identify strongly with a group-a
religious or ethnic group, for example-there is a human tendency to resist
believing information that casts our in-group in a harsh light.- Thus we
might expect many Bosnian Serbs who did not carry out atrocities
themselves to discredit information, however well-documented, about
atrocities committed by other Serbs.
It may well be the case that this dynamic accounts in part for why it
took decades for a majority of German citizens to condemn National
Socialism in a forthright fashion. It required the emergence of a new
generation, one that was not implicated itself in the Holocaust, to condemn
the singular atrocities of Nazi Germany. For the most part, the generation
who were adults during the period of National Socialism did not condemn
themselves.
It is instructive, as well, to recall how German citizens reacted to
Nuremberg. Many welcomed the trial before the International Military
Tribunal (IMT) while it was underway because they interpreted the
prosecution of leading Nazi figures as an exoneration of their own
responsibility for the Holocaust.
The most common "meaning" or
"understanding" of Nuremberg among Germans was that a handful of
leaders-those in the dock-was responsible for World War II and the
atrocities associated with it.But it soon became clear that a majority of Germans had no interest in
a process of reckoning that swept more widely. Allied prosecutions of
Nazi war criminals conducted soon after the IMT trial "were greeted
mainly with rejection and protest,"- and Germans soon revised their
assessment of the IMT, as well as the principles for which it stood.-

20 See Sabina Cehaji&Clancy, Dealing with Ingroup Committed Atrocities: Moral
Responsibility and Group-Based Guilt, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTRACABLE CONFLICTS

103, 103 (Eran Halperin & Keren Sharvit, eds. 2015); Sabina (ehajiClancy et a]., Affirmation,
Acknowledgment of In-Group Responsibility, Group-Based Guilt, and Support for Reparative
Measures, 101 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 256 (2011); Sabina
& Rupert Brown,
Silencing the Past: Effects ofIntergroup Contact on Acknowledgment ofIn-Group Responsibility, I
SOC. PSYCHOL. &PERSONALITY SCL 190, 192 (2010).
21
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 4, at 440-41.
22 See Susanne Karstedt, Coming to Terms with the Past in Germany after 1945 and 1989:
PublicJudgments on Proceduresand Justice, 20 L. & POL'Y 15, 24 (1998); TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A
HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 54, 809 (2005); Donald Bloxham, The Nuremberg Trials and the

iehajid

Occupation ofGermany, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1601-03 (2005-06).
23 NORBERT FREI, ADENAUER'S GERMANY AND THE NAZI PAST: THE POLITICS OF AMNESTY
AND INTEGRATION 94 (Joel Golb trans., 2002).
24 See ORENTLICHER,supra note 4, at434-35.
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Second, people tend to process new information in a way that squares
with what they already believe to be true. Put differently, many are
disposed to reject information that is inconsistent with what they believe
they already know. Thus if wartime propaganda relentlessly conveyed to
Serbs that they faced a mortal threat from Bosnian Muslims, as it did, and
then a Tribunal in The Hague concluded that Bosnian Serbs committed
grievous atrocities against Muslims, many Serbs would be primed to reject
this new information. And humans are almost ingenious in our capacity to
find grounds to discredit information we are loath to believe.- Among
many Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia, a key strategy was to dismiss the
ICTY's findings on the asserted grounds that the Tribunal itself was an
instrument of anti-Serb bias."
Third, most of us rely on trusted sources to cue us on what to believe.
Each of us is too busy to assess for ourselves complex information about
every issue that matters. Instead, we typically rely on leaders, experts,
friends and communities in whom we have confidence to help us figure
out what to make of a wealth of complex information.Fatefully, in the former Yugoslavia political leaders and elites with a
vested interest in discrediting the ICTY have often served that role. From
the time the Tribunal was created, Serbia's wartime leader, Slobodan
Milogevid, and other Serbian leaders wove the ICTY into a broader
narrative of Serb victimization. As Mirko Klarin has noted, their motives
were self-serving: deeply implicated in wartime atrocities, "it was not in
the best interests" of the Milogevid regime "for the public in [Serbia] to
Instead, its
have a positive image of the ICTY's mission and work."
was
Tribunal
the
that
subjects
their
convince
to
could
they
all
"did
leaders

See Erica Dawson et al., Motivated Reasoning and Performance on the Wason Selection
25
Task, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1379, 1380 (2002); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization. The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
26 See Charles S. Taber& Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism and the Evaluations ofPolitical

Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. Sci. 755, 755, 761-63 (2006); but see Thomas Wood & Ethan Porter, The
Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes' Steadfast Factual Adherence, 41 POL. BEHAV.135 (2019)
(suggesting most people do not engage in too much cognitive work to reject information they

disbelieve).
27
28

See ORENTLICHER,supra note 4, at220-21.
See Case R. Sunstein, What's Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 97

Nw. U.L. REV. 1295, 1299-1300, 1305-14 (2003).

29 Mirko Klarin, The Impact ofthe ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 89, 90 (2009).
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biased and hostile" towards Serbia.In Bosnia, one of the most strident and influential Serb nationalists,
Milorad Dodik, has long calculated that his personal and political interests
are best served by espousing denialist rhetoric. In particular, Dodik
apparently believes that challenging the ICTY's rulings helped him win
successive elections.
Whatever his motives, Dodik's denialist claims
have caused incalculable harm. Imagine the pain survivors of the
Srebrenica massacre, which the ICTY and International Court of Justice
have ruled a genocide, must experience when they hear Dodik dismiss
Srebrenica as "the greatest deception of the 20 Century."-

In short, for a variety of reasons we do not see anything like a shared
understanding of the 1990s conflict in the Western Balkans, despite the
ICTY's meticulous work. Instead, a multitude of incommensurable
histories have been constructed and are contested in increasingly worrying
ways.
III. HONORNG MEMORY IN POLARIZED SOCIETIES

In light of this sobering pattern, some scholars have concluded that the
work of the ICTY, rather than fostering a shared understanding of the
1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia, intensified divisions in the
region.- As evidence, they cite ethnically-divided responses to ICTY
verdicts.It is true that political leaders and citizens have routinely denounced
verdicts that convict a member of their ethnic group and celebrated

30

Id.

31
See ORENTLICHER, supra note 4, at 300-01. Dodik previously served as prime minister and
then president of the Serb entity in Bosnia. Since October 2018, he has served as the Serb member of
Bosnia's three-person presidency.

32

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶T 21, 23 (Int'l

Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Application of Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43,

Judgment ¶ 297 (Feb. 26, 2007).

33 Katharina Bart & Maja Zuvela, Bosnian Serb Leader: Srebrenica Was 20th Century's
'Greatest Deception,' REUTERS (June 25, 2015), reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-serbia-arrest/bosnianserb-leader-srebrenica-was-20th-centurys-greatest-deception-idUSKBNOP5IOL20150625.
34 See, e.g., Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors:Principleand Pragmatismin
StrategiesofInternationalJustice, 28:3 INT'L SECURITY 5, 21 (2003-04).
35 See, e.g., Janine Natalya Clark, Justice Farfrom Reconciliation, OSSERVATORIO BALCANI E
CAUCASO TRANSEUROPA (May 5, 2013), https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Balkans/Justicefar-from-reconciliation-131640.
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of defendants whose victims share their ethnicity.- Even so, I
these scholars' causation claims persuasive. Regional leaders
every opportunity to advance denialist narratives, and have
myriad settings, whether or not the ICTY recently issued an

More troubling in its possible implications for efforts to combat
denialism is social science research indicating that attempts to correct false
beliefs can have a "backfire effect," at least among certain people. Rather
than persuading those audiences to change their minds, this research
suggests that presenting information at odds with their beliefs can lead
them to hold more firmly to incorrect views." This research raises the
question whether efforts to counter denialist views in Bosnia could, at
least in some circumstances, backfire.
On a related note, some have suggested that, if we wish to encourage a
society to address a dark chapter in its past through an honest reckoning,
we might do well to observe a period of what amounts to transitional
amnesia.- Better let matters rest for awhile, the argument runs, because if
you keep the denialists busy denying, they will pass their beliefs on to
another generation.
Yet the implications of this perspective are deeply unsettling. For as
long as I can remember, I was taught that people of conscience bear a
sacred duty to remember crimes against humanity and the precious lives
lost to such wrongs. We remember and bear witness for myriad reasons,

36

See, e.g., Bosnians Ethnically Divided Over Karadzic Life Sentence,

BALKANS

TRANSITIONAL JUST., Mar. 20, 2019.
37 One study found that, while ICTY arrests and verdicts tended to trigger an immediate surge

in inter-ethnic hostility, they had little effect on societal peace overall. James Meernik, Justice and
Peace? How the InternationalCriminal Tribunal Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia, 42 J. PEACE RES.
271, 287 (2005). In a later study, Meemik and a co-author found that, among Bosnian survey
participants, there tended to be a positive correlation between a favorable view of the ICTY and
"reconciled attitudes towards members of other ethnic groups." James Meemik & Jose Raul Guerrero,
Can InternationalCriminal Justice Advance Ethnic Reconciliation? The ICTY and Ethnic Relations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 14 SOUTHEAST EUR. & BLACK SEA STUD. 383, 397, 400 (2014).

38 See, e.g., Vedran Pavlid, Tensions between Croatia and Serbia to Rise Again?, TOTAL
CROATIA NEWS (July 16, 2017).
39 See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 319-20 (2010).
40

See TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 61 (2005); See also Marko

Milanovi, Courting Failure: When Are InternationalCriminalCourts Likely to Be Believed by Local
Audiences?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 13-16 (Kevin Jon Heller

et at. eds.) (forthcoming 2021).
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each profoundly important.
We commit to remembrance in no small part to honor those who
perished, ensuring they live on in our hearts as they should have lived out
their natural lives.- Holocaust survivor and Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel
believed that, in addition, we bear a duty to preserve memory of the
singular horrors of the Third Reich because it is the surest way to upend
what the Nazis sought to achieve-erasing memory and, with it, culture
itself. As Wiesel put it, "without memory, there is no culture. Without
memory, there would be no civilization, no society, no future."In a similar vein Holocaust survivor Primo Levi, another singular voice
of conscience, saw that the complete negation of morality embodied in
Nazi ideology and practice entailed the destruction of civilization itself. In
his words, "It is worth considering the fact that all of them, master and
pupils, gradually took leave of reality at the same pace as their morals
became detached from the morals common to every time and every
civilization."Wiesel believed as well that, by bearing witness, survivors might
prevent others from experiencing barbaric forms of human depredation. In
his words, by speaking about what they endured, Holocaust survivors
might "shake humanity out of its indifference and keep the torturer from
torturing ever again."- Levi similarly believed that reckoning with the
Holocaust is crucial to prevention, writing:
"knowing is imperative,
because what happened could happen again. Conscience can be seduced
and obscured again-even our consciences.",
If, as Wiesel put it, "it is memory that will save humanity" if anything

41
A recent article in the New York Times captures the power of bearing witness, and its
meaning to a young Polish Jew, Renia Spiegel, who kept a diary as the Final Solution closed in on her.
Writing about Spiegel's diary, which was to be published 77 years after her death, the Times reporter
said: "At a moment when basic agreement over simple truths has become a political battleground and
history a weapon, the publication" of the diary "offers a reminder of the power of bearing witness." In
her first entry, Spiegel wrote: "I want someone I can talk to . . who will feel what I feel, believe what I
say..." Joanna Berendt, A Slain Jewish Girl's Diary ofLife Under the Soviets and the Nazis, N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 24, 2019, at A7.
42
Elie
Wiesel,

A

God

Who

Remembers,

NPR

(Apr.

7,

2008),

https://www.npr.org/2008/04/07/89357808/a-god-who-remembers.
43
Primo Levi, quoted in Edward Mendelson, Bearer of Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2015, at
SBR1. Levi also wrote that the "entire history" of the Third Reich "can be reread as a war against
memory, an Orwellian falsification of memory, falsification of reality, negation of reality." PRIMO
LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 21 (Raymond Rosenthal trans., 1988).

44 Elie Wiesel, Nobel Lecture: Hope, Despair and Memory (Dec. 11, 1986).
45 PRIMO LEVI, IF THISISA MAN / THE TRUCE, 442 (2013 ed.).
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can,6 bearing witness cannot be solely a private matter. If there is a duty
to remember, it is one that impels us to speak out. To be sure, in a region
where denialism is pervasive, as it is in Bosnia and neighboring countries,
bearing witness can be disruptive, as acts of political and social resistance
often are. And yet-and here I come back to the unsettling questions I
raised earlier-what if speaking out, what if relentlessly demanding that
denialists accept well-established facts as well as the moral meaning of
those facts backfires? What if bearing witness leads denialists to turn up
the volume of dangerous discourses?
These questions merit substantial attention.
note several general considerations.

Here, I can only briefly

First, we would do well to mine the insights of new social science
research that can help us become smarter and wiser about strategies for
persuading people to align their beliefs with facts rather than falsehoods.Second, we should take care not to overstate the implications of research
that has identified a backfire effect. New research already suggests that
studies identifying and then "confirming" such an effect overstated the
risk.- In a similar vein, and as I have already intimated, there is good
reason to question the conclusion of some scholars that the ICTY fueled
ethnic tensions in Bosnia.
Third, particularly when our understanding of the social dynamics
surrounding the entrenchment and abatement of denialism remains poor,
we would do well to honor and support the agency of survivors in
identifying worthwhile processes of knowledge production and meaningmaking in their societies. In Bosnia, survivors of wartime atrocities have

&

46 Wiesel, supra note 45.
47 See, e.g., Sabina Ciehajid-Clancy et al., Affirmation, Acknowledgment of In-Group
Responsibility, Group-Based Guilt, and Supportfor Reparative Measures, 101 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSYCHOL. 256, 267 (2011) (strategies that enable individuals to view themselves positively
N.
apparently increase their willingness to acknowledge wrongdoing); Toby Bolsen & James
Druckman, Validating Conspiracy Beliefs and Effectively Communicating Scientific Consensus, 10

WEATHER CLIMATE & Soc'Y 453, 456-57 (2018) (validating general conspiracy beliefs of individuals

who believe climate change is a hoax may make them more receptive to scientific consensus messages
contradicting this view); Gordon Pennycook & David Rand, Why Do People Fall for Fake News?,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2019, at SR12 (results of recent research, some not yet published, suggest that
cultivating analytic reasoning may increase the likelihood that people will recognize incorrect
information).
48 See Thomas Wood & Ethan Porter, The Elusive Backfire Effect: Mass Attitudes' Steadfast

FactualAdherence, 41 POL. BEHAV. 135, 160-61 (2019).
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been at the forefront of efforts to challenge denialism.Finally, we would do well to recognize that knowledge and memorymaking processes are profoundly shaped by the political and social
contexts in which they unfold.- And in Bosnia, the political context is
hardly conducive to the construction of a shared understanding of the past.
Among other reasons, the ethnic segregation enshrined in the Bosnian
Constitution, imposed as part of the Dayton peace agreement, impedes
daily encounters that foster empathy among the country's ethnic groups,
without which constructing a shared understanding of the past is
inconceivable. Moreover, the complex political arrangements imposed in
the Constitution incentivize appeals to extreme nationalism. It is hardly
surprising, then, that elections have often favored hardline nationalists. In
short, if we hope to see an end to denialism, much of the work will have to
be done in the realm of politics.
IV. CONCLUSION
These challenges are deeply complicated, and many of their underlying
dynamics are beyond our control. But to paraphrase the wise sage J.K.
Rowling, there is an immense power in human empathy, particularly when
it leads to collective action." Nowhere is the power of human empathyand the possibility of constructing a shared understanding of the past that
empathy enables-more urgently needed than in Bosnia.

49 For discussion of local initiatives to reconstruct memories of war in Bosnia's divided
societies, see ORENTLICHER, supra note 4, at 319-20.
50 See Ereshnee Naidu, Memory Beyond Transitions: The Role of Memory in Long-Term Social
Reconstruction, 6 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 161, 171 (2012) (book review).
51 See ORENTLICHER, SOME KIND OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 293-95.
52 J.K. Rowling, Harvard Commencement Speech (June 5,2008).

